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Abstract 
 
The article explores the genesis of constitutionalism back to the science of international 
law during the inter-war years and offers a sketched genealogy of the fate of the 
constitutional idea from the Second World War to the emergence of a post-
reconstructive doctrine in the post-Cold War era. To account for the contemporary 
hydra-like renewal of constitutional parlance in international law, a series of converging 
factors, namely fragmentation and deformalization, as well as the effects of empire and 
the illegitimacy of global governance on both domestic and international democratic 
grounds, are examined. The article goes on to argue that the terms of the debate which 
shaped the foundational period of contemporary international law appear today reversed 
in international legal scholarship and hints at how the field of international 
constitutionalism can be profitably enriched when set against the doctrinal background 
offered by the democratic debate in international law. The possibilities of this doctrinal 
cross-fertilisation are shown by reference to the three dimensions of emergence of the 
democratic principle which, I argue, is the wind rose of international law.   
 
1 Introduction 
 
Despite the disciplinary warning that the current “inflationary use of the word 
constitution entails the danger of its devaluation”,1 it is becoming increasingly difficult 
for international lawyers to blind themselves to the overlapping number of doctrinal 
trends that are currently making use of the constitutionalist vernacular in international 
legal literature. While each of these trends is contributing to the development of this 
area of studies, each of them is also seeking doctrinal pre-eminence within an emerging 
legal constitutionalist consensus that appears increasingly blurred in its contours and 
definition. Such a constant growth of international constitutionalist talk is, moreover, 
obscuring the reality that constitutionalist debates are not an exception to the nihil novum 
sub sole axiom as applied to the international legal order. The constant spurring of 
constitutionalist-oriented legal literature in the post-Cold war scenario, and the descent 
into oblivion of its doctrinal origins, have made the doctrinal state of the art in this area 
increasingly reminiscent of the confusion of  King Agramant’s Camp as depicted by 
Ariosto in Orlando Furioso. To help situate the contemporary rise of constitutionalist 
parlance in international law, an exploration of its early 20th century doctrinal precedents 
is offered. In this context, special attention is given to the constitutionalist strand shaped 
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by Kelsenian positivists during the inter-war years as this has been claimed as antecedent 
by those who have sought to resuscitate the hitherto “doctrinal and abstract” 
international constitutionalist discussion, a discussion which had been domestically 
compromised in the field of political theory for decades.2 A brief notice of the doctrinal 
pedigree of the German international constitutional school in the foundational period of 
contemporary international law is complemented by reference to the works of the 
Spanish doctrine of international law during the interwar years and through the early 
stages of General Franco’s regime. Such a reminder will precede a sketched genealogy of 
the fate of the constitutional idea from the Second World War’s doctrinal aftermath up 
to the present. From this reconstruction, it is gleaned that the contemporary rise of 
international constitutionalist parlance is intrinsically connected to a “narrative of 
continuation with the past”3 that favours a reading of international law as a “natural” 
evolution that develops from co-existence, to co-operation, through regional and global 
law, to constitutionalization. In this light, the constitutionalist renewal in international 
law can be seen as the post-Cold War international legal harvest of a series of normative 
developments sprung from the soil of the post-Second World War era, soil which had 
been nurtured by the debates of the inter-war years. A review of doctrinal history, 
however, is not enough to fully grasp the dynamics that have permitted such a trend, 
critically defined as a “weak reading of international constitutionalism”4 because it is 
“rooted in positivism and determined not to lose touch with actual state practice”5 in its 
pretension to blend the "normatively desirable and the normatively feasible”,6 to regain 
momentum in contemporary international legal literature. To gain a more accurate 
perspective of this doctrinal development, one needs to approach the hydra-like renewal 
of international constitutionalism as a corollary of the “post-realist age”.7  It is against 
the background of an epochal characterisation that mirrors the effects of the ethos8 of 
international law in its constant flight for politics to extend the rule of law to the 
international plane in a liberal favourable post-Cold war globalised stage, that the second 
part examines how international legal constitutionalism has become a fashionable term 
of art for a wide-ranging set of ideas held together by the powerful rhetorical appeal of 
the constitutionalist vernacular. 
 
Historically an “offspring of international institutionalization”, international 
constitutionalism in the post-Cold War in part owes its exponential growth to the 
phenomenon of globalization. A number of converging factors backing up the 
contemporary reinforcement of constitutional talk in international law are, therefore, 
examined. First among them is the analysis of international constitutionalisation as a 
systemic counter-reaction to the worries engendered by the proliferation of specialised 
regimes in international law.9 An evaluation of this factor is accompanied by a brief 
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Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (2005) 103, at 105. 
5 Fassbender, supra note 1, at 320. 
6 Von Bodagny, “The Telos of International Law: Christian Tomuschat’s General Course and the Evolution 
of the Universalist Tradition” in P.-M. Dupuy et al. (eds.), Common Values in International Law, Festschrift 
Christian Tomuschat (2006), 703, at 721. 
7 Koskenniemi, International Law in a Post-Realist Era, 16 Australian Yrbk Int’l L (1995). 
8Koskenniemi, Entre engagement et cynisme: aperçu d’une théorie du droit international en tant que pratique, in 
M.Koskenniemi, La politique du droit international (2007) 359. 
9Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, International Law 
Commission, fifty-eight session, UN General Assembly, A/ CN.4/ L.682, (2006).  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735036
Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, “At King Agramant’s Camp – Old Debates, New Constitutional Times”, 8 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 3 Symposium on Global Constitutionalism  (Draft - unedited version)  2010  (Forthcoming). Final version 
accessible at: http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/ 
appraisal of a form of functional differentiation known as the fragmentation of 
international law.10 It is also examined how, in regard to fears of fragmentation, the 
formal constitutionalisation of international law presents itself as a pre-emptive response 
to alternative constitutionalising vocabularies tackling  the complexity of global 
governance as the “fragmented/societal model of constitutionalism” pace N. 
Luhmman.11 Second among the selected converging factors behind the international 
constitutionalist renewal, I shall turn to its understanding as a reaction to empire12 
whose instrumentalist core is embedded in an on-going anti-formalist “turn to ethics” in 
international law.13 The effects of empire, in association with a second form of 
functional differentiation - termed the deformalisation14 of international law - will be 
examined. It will be argued that these act as a factor fostering the acceptance of a 
managerialist vocabulary15 of compliance, legitimacy and cost-benefit analysis in a 
growing stepping over16 of the discipline of international relations into the domain 
proper to international law. Finally, the constitutionalist renewal in international law will 
be approached as a follow-up to the perceived illegitimacy of global governance on both 
domestic and international democratic grounds.17 The role played by the notion of 
legitimacy in the constitutional field shall, then, be set against the benchmark provided 
by three separate dimensions of the emergence of the principle of democratic 
governance in international law that will be  respectively, identified as with its intra-state, 
the inter-state and the supra-state dimensions. Once these converging factors behind the 
hydra-like renewal of constitutional parlance in international law have been examined, I 
will briefly tackle the extent to which the terms of the debate during the inter-war years 
appear today reversed in a contemporary cross-bred transitional paradigmatic age that is 
evolving from an international legal order grounded on the myth of Westphalia to one 
where democracy stands as the elusive, yet insurpassable horizon, of international law 
for the 21st century.  
2. International Constitutionalism as a continuation of a narrative with the past.  
 
A simplified account of the pedigree of international legal constitutionalism might begin 
by describing a series of early constitutional visions of international law that were part of 
a broader doctrinal attempt to temper what were considered the “excesses” of the 19th 
century voluntarist theories of the positivist modern school and their “absolutist” 
theoretical justification of the state’s freedom to bind itself externally and accidentally to 
international law. Against the backdrop of the burgeoning of nationalist sentiment in 
Europe leading up to the First World War, positivism18 had given rise to a number of 
Hegelian-inspired theoretical understandings of the international legal order.19 
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Global Law” 25 MJIL (2003-2004) 999. 
12Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as a Mindset: Reflection on Kantian Themes About International Law and Globalisation, 
8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2007) 12. 
13 Koskenniemi, “The Lady Doth Protest too Much” Kosovo and the Turn to Ethics in International Law”65 MLR 
(2002) 159.  
14M.Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (2001)  
15 Koskenniemi, Legitimacy, Rights and Ideology: Notes Towards a Critique of the New Moral Internationalism, 7 
Associations Journal for Legal and Social Theory 349 (2003), 349.  
16 Koskenniemi, Formalismo, fragmentación y libertad. Temas kantianos en el Derecho internacional actual 2 Revista 
Internacional de Pensamiento Político (2007) 209. 
17 Wolfrum, “Legitimacy in International Law from a Legal Perspective”, in R.Wolfrum & V. Röben (eds.) 
Legitimacy and International Law (2008) 1.  
18 A. Truyol y Serra, Historia de la Filosofía del Derecho y del Estado. Vol. 3º Idealismo y positivismo (2004) 
19  Ibid., at 297-313.  
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According to these understandings, international law was either to be seen as “state 
external law”; as “a law of coordination” presided over by Kaufman’s principle of “nur, 
der, der kann, darf auch”;20 as a product, in Jellinek’s account, of the state’s “self-
commitment or self-limitation”;21 or, as conceptualised by Triepel, as a common will 
resulting from normative agreements (Vereinbarung). Shaped by an array of approaches 
to the science of international law that shared a common programmatic spirit, the 
debate among international legal scholars during the inter-war years regarded the nature 
and ultimate foundation of the binding character of international legal norms and led to 
the heyday of its consideration as the “ancillary stone of international law.”22 This 
foundational period of contemporary doctrine echoed the establishment of the League 
of Nations and its attempt at breaking history’s narrative to allow for the transition from 
pre-institutional to an institutionalised international order.23 The new doctrine sought to 
defend the primacy of international law over domestic law to smooth the accomodation 
of “unbridled sovereign autonomy” characterizing the pre-First World War era, which 
before had only been tamed by the exigencies of a strategically-concerted balance of 
power, so that a “social order among sovereigns could be achieved”.24 A continuation of 
the locus classicus’ attempts at “squaring the circle of statehood and international law”, 
such a progressive doctrinal mood acted to ground the “position of the State as 
integrally and necessarily part of an international order” against both a form of monist 
theory according primacy to municipal law and against some of the refashioned dualist 
theories of the time  prominent among which was Anzilotti’s normativist theory 
approach25 which placed pacta sunt servanda as an a priori assumption to surpass 
voluntarism. This strand of thought that spread all over the European doctrinal stage is 
today known as the reconstructive doctrine.26  
 
One strand of such a critique of sovereignty “joined French liberal solidarism with the 
sociological jurisprudence that developed in Germany in the 1920s”.27 Representative of 
the spirit of the epoch is the consciously anti-positivist “idiosyncratic legal monism”28of 
G. Scelle, whose sociological approach to international law imagined a global federalist 
utopia29 founded on the notion of natural solidarity.30 Other monist variants of 
international constitutionalism arising from traditions of domestic jurisprudence and 
political theory at the time, include the one championed by an Italian school with S. 
Romano’s theory of institution31 as its core which prolonged the tradition of Von 
Savigny’s school in its identification of the international constitution with the normative 
translation of the (international) community’s fundamental structure as a social fact.32 
During the inter-war years, when “the field [of international law] became 
professionalized and its basic concepts and structures were set in place”33, a common 
                                               
20 E.Kaufmann, Das Wessen des Völkerrechts und die clausula rebus sic stantibus, (1911).  
21 Koskenniemi, supra note 14, at 198-206.  
22 J.B.Whitton, “La règle “pacta sunt servanda”, RCADI (1934), at 177.  
23 Kennedy, “The Move to Institutions” 8 Cardozo LR (1987) 841. 
24 Ibid., at 834. 
25 Gaja, “Positivism and Dualism in Dionisio Anzilotti”, 3 EJIL (1992) , 123-138.  
26 Ibid., at 159. 
27 Koskenniemi, “History of International Law, World War I to World War II” Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, at 10-12.  
28 M. Koskenniemi, supra note 14, at 327-338.   
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mondiale ”, 47  Archives de philosophie du droit (2003) 191. 
30 Scelle, “Le droit constitutionnel international” in Mélanges Carré de Malberg (1933), 503.  
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32 R. Kolb, Théorie du ius cogens international: Essai de relecture du concept (2001) ,  at  103.   
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aim of much international legal writing  was to establish the relevance of international 
law as a constraining factor in inter-state relations.34 However, it would be in German-
speaking academic quarters35 where the attempt at overcoming positivism from within 
positivism itself would give way to the most influential effort to come to grips with the 
“sovereign question” from the perspective of contemporary constitutionalism. An 
analysis of international law’s resulting self-constitutive bias towards community order 
as the monist (of the kind that accords primacy to international law)36 grounding for an 
international constitutionalist perspective, 37 calls for a very brief reference to Kelsen’s 
Pure Theory of Law.  
 
As is widely known, H. Kelsen’s monism in defense of the unity of national and 
international law under a single legal system was pursued as an “epistemological 
postulate”38to escape Austin’s circularity problem.39 In Kelsen, the derivation of the 
international legal system from a single normative non-will-based source becomes the 
core of its constitutional character. This explains why Kelsen could write about a 
“constitution in a logical sense”40 at the top of a system of legal validity, or otherwise as 
the ultimate basis of obligation in a legal system empirically approached as one 
grounded on a concept of legal imputation that “avoids identifying law in terms of an 
intuitive correspondence with an idea of right”.41 The father of the logical or normativist 
strand of positivism, and neo-Kantian legal theorist, by leaving the realm of social 
relations in his quest to isolate the autonomous scientific character of law attempted to 
de-pyschologize the “command theory” and its portrayal of international law as 
“positive morality”. He did, however, so while remaining faithful to the Austin’s notion 
of law as effectively backed by sanctions - a notion that underlies his view of positive 
law as a system of valid norms.42 Moreover, to counteract the hypothetical nature of an 
international legal order perennially at the whim of the changing sovereign will of the 
state and the ensuing existence of mutually exclusive domestic orders43 pursuant State 
solipsism,44 Kelsen depicted his opting for international law as superior to domestic law 
as one that was ethically grounded. In theoretically dissolving the dogma of sovereignty 
- that he understood, as the main instrument of the imperialist challenge to the 
international legal order - which was, in his view, one of the more important outcomes 
of Reine Rechtslehre - Kelsen believed that a hitherto insurmountable obstacle to any 
attempt at the progressive centralisation of international law had been surmounted.45 
His conspicuous argument that, in opting for international law as superior to national 
law, he was respectively choosing objectivism, altruism and pacificism over subjectivism, 
egoism and imperialism is, furthermore, consistent with the general representation of 
the telos of international law as a progressive and liberal one.  
                                               
34 Koskenniemi, supra note 27, at 10-12.  
35 Koskenniemi, “Georg Friedrich Von Martens (1756-1821) and the Origins of Modern International Law” 
NYU Institute of International Law and Justice Working Papers 1/2006, available at 
http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2006-1-HT-Koskenniemi-web.pdf (last visited October 2008)  
36 H.Kelsen, General Theory of Law & State (Ed. by J.Treviño) (2006), at 386. Somek, “Kelsen Lives”, 18 EJIL 3 
(2007) 409, at 422. 
37 D. Zolo, Cosmópolis, Perspectiva y riesgos de un gobierno mundial, (2000)  
38  Kelsen, supra note 36, at  373. 
39
 C.Mieville Between Equal Rights, A Marxist Theory of International Law (2007), at 34-35. 
40
 B.Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto. A Constitutional Perspective (1998) 
41  Carty “The Continuous Influence of Kelsen on the General Perception of the Discipline of International 
Law”, 9 EJIL (1998) 
42 Zolo, supra note 37, at 143. 
43 H. Kelsen, La teoría pura del Derecho: introducción a la problemática científica del Derecho, (1979), at 187.  
44
 Kelsen, supra note 36, at 386. 
45 Kelsen, supra note 43, at 199.   
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Against this background, the monist approach of Alfred Verdross, who is 
retrospectively claimed as the forerunner of what is now called the “international 
community law school”, did not, unlike that of the most conspicuous representative of 
the Vienna school’s most prominent representative, rely on an unverifiable scientific 
Grundnorm46 resulting from an attack on the irrational ideal of justice as a “subjective 
judgement of value.” The Verdrossian approach, which resulted from a gradual 
departure from Verdross’s earlier formal theoretical orientation to legal philosophy, 
amounted to a grounding of the theoretical foundations of international law on the 
normative idea of the moral unity of mankind, or otherwise on a natural law conception 
of “objective justice” as the ultimate source of law.47  
 
Verdross’s conception, which was informed by a universalistic tradition retraceable to 
the Spanish Siglo de Oro,48 benefitted from the recuperation, by a generation of Spanish 
international scholars headed by Camilo Barcia Trelles49 with the valuable help of 
J.B.Scott,50 of the Salamanca school.51 The marked relevance of anchoring the Christian 
community-oriented universalism of Vitoria, and especially that of Suarez,52 in 
recovering the “humanist” interpretation of the Salamanca school as the founding 
fathers of international law,53 for the resurgence of Verdross’ neo-naturalist trend, 
should, however, not obscure the fact that a “scholastic” or medieval interpretation of 
Vitoria was also at the heart of Carl Schmitt’s reconstruction of the European public 
order in terms of friend/enemy.54 Although Schmitt’s existentialism would be tempered 
on Christian ius-naturalist grounds in its Spanish domestic political reception, the very 
constitutive enshrining of a Spanish tradition of international law along such lines is 
found at the core of the Franco regime's main trump cards in foreign policy, namely the 
consideration of Spain as the last stronghold of Christian European values after the 
Second World War. The fact that C. Schmitt is a widely-recognised behind-the-scenes 
influence55 on the political conceptual architecture of the Spanish authoritarian regime 
erected from the ashes of the Spanish Civil War, largely through the work of F.Javier 
Conde,56 accounts for the doctrinal connection between Spanish and German 
international legal theorists that began during the inter-war years and extended far 
                                               
46Also D. Cass, The Constitutionalisation of the World Trade Organisation: Legitimacy, Democracy and Community in the 
International Trading System (2005) at 32-39.   
47  R. Kolb, Les cours généraux de droit international public de l’Académie  de la Haye, (2004), 31. 
48 Legaz Lacambra “La influencia de la doctrina de Kelsen en la Ciencia Jurídica española” Revista de estudios 
políticos, Nº 96, (1957), 29, at 39. Truyol y Serra, “Don Antonio de Luna García (1901-1967)”, in Estudios de 
Derecho Internacional Homenaje a D. Antonio de Luna (1968). 
49 See, respectively, by C. Barcia Trelles, « F. de Vitoria et l'Ecole moderne du Droit International», RCADI t. 
XVII (1928). « Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) : les théologiens espagnols du XVIe siècle et l'école moderne 
du droit international » RCADI, (1933-I) 43.« Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca. L'école espagnole du 
Droit international du XVIe siécle, RCADI 67 (1939) 433. 
50 Brown Scott, “Asociación Francisco de Vitoria”, 22 AJIL 1, (1928) 136.   
51 A. Verdross, Derecho Internacional Público (1955), at xii. A.Truyol y Serra, Histoire du droit international public 
(1995), at 150. 
52 Simma, « The Contribution of Alfred Verdross to the Theory of International Law » 6 EJIL 1 (1995) 33, at 
40. 
53 Kennedy “Primitive Legal Scholarship” 27 (1) Harvard ILJ(1986) 1. 
54
 Monereo, “Soberanía y orden internacional en Carl Schmitt” preliminary study to C.Schmitt El Nomos de la 
Tierra en el derecho de gentes del “ius publicum europaeum”  (2002), at CXXI. 
55 López Garcia, “La presencia de Carl Schmitt en España”, 91 Revista de Estudios Políticos (1996) 139. See 
.Truyol y Serra,  supra note 18, at  313. 
56 F.J. Conde, Teoría y sistema de las formas políticas (1944) and F.J.Conde Representación Política y Régimen Español 
(1945) 
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beyond the Second World War.57 Against the background of the German discipline’s 
bitterness against the League of Nations after 1919, the neo-naturalist variant of the 
Vienna school runs parallel to Verdross’s scholarly political ambiguities in defence of 
the Anschluss and his murky political allegiance to National Socialism.58 Contextual 
historical episodes aside, the abstract idea of the moral unity of mankind, on which 
Verdross’s monism was grounded, found itself associated, through the notion of 
international community, with the constitutional unity of a unique universal legal 
system. Such a system was originally posited as a hierarchical model constitutionally 
crowned by “a series of fundamental principles of international law determining its 
sources, subjects and execution, and the jurisdiction allocated to states”59 which, 
although based on the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”, referred back to “material 
considerations susceptible to translating ideas of justice and common good”. For 
Verdross, the general principles of law, which in their international legal form, were for 
him a reflection of the legal conscience of the international community, became “a 
bridge between the pure natural law and the pure positive law”.60 The formal positivist 
Kelsenian international law’s self-constitutive bias towards a community-order appears, 
thus, replaced in Verdross’s thinking by an underlying theory of justice grounded on the 
realisation of universal communal values of Christian humanist inspiration.61 
 
However, for the establishment of a positively mandated consensus-based international 
legal order - one which, according to a representative of the constitutionalist  renewal, 
“must remain attuned to realities without, however, abandoning its normative pretence 
in lieu of a purely empirical description of factual patterns of behaviour”62, a series of 
normative developments, which would eventually amount to what R-J.Dupuy referred 
to as the “positivisation of natural law”,63 still  needed, by that time, to be developed and 
conceptualised. That is, what Bianchi has recently defined as the “magic of ius cogens”, 
and its “almost intrinsic relationship with human rights”,64 had yet to be “summoned” 
by international lawyers65 in confluence with the enshrinement in case law of the notion 
of erga omnes and the gradual construction of the theoretical architecture of a system of 
aggravated responsibility for serious violations of norms of particular importance to the 
international community. Only then could the hierarchy of norms, thought to be a 
necessary ingredient in the process of the constitutionalization of international law, start 
to be fleshed out by the gradual emergence of a supra-positive public order of norms of 
                                               
57 De la Rasilla del Moral “The Zero Years of Spanish International Law, 1939-1953” in E. Jouannet and 
Iulia Motoc (Eds.)  Les doctrines internationalistes durant les années du  communisme réel en Europe (Forthcoming, 
2010)  
58 Carty “Alfred Verdross and Othmar Spann: German Romantic Nationalism, National Socialism and 
International Law” 6 EJIL 1 (1995) 78. Also Simma, supra note 52, at 36. 
59 For the evolving path of the definition of international constitution in Verdross’s successive works, see 
B.Fassbender, supra 40, at 37-45. 
60 See Simma, supra note 52, at 49.  
61 Truyol y Serra “Esbozo de una sociología del derecho natural”  Revista de Estudios Políticos 44 (1949) 15. 
García Arias, “Las concepciones iusnaturalistas sobre la fundamentación del Derecho internacional” in 
Estudios de Historia y doctrina del Derecho internacional (1964), 14. 
62 Tomuschat, “International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century : General 
Course on Public International Law“ 281 RCADI (1999) 9, at 43. 
63 See René-Jean Dupuy’s remarks at the meeting of the Committee of the Whole on 30 Apr. 1968 (UN 
Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session Vienna, 26 Mar. – 24 May 1968, Offi cial Records, 
Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Committee of the Whole, at 258, para. 74) quoted in 
Bianchi, “Human Rights and the Magic of ius cogens” 19 EJIL 3 (2008) 491, 492. 
64 Bianchi, supra note 63, at 495.  
65On Verdross’ influence on the conceptualization of ius cogens and an overview of its historical evolution, 
Shelton, “Normative Hierarchy in International Law” 100 AJIL 2 (2006), 291, at 297. 
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fundamental character reflective of a prioritization of humanist values and, thus, 
complete the squaring of the circle of statehood and international law initiated on 
critical neo-positivist formal grounds by Kelsen.66 While the turn to natural law during 
the inter-war years “consolidated the profession’s self-image as part of a historical 
continuum (…)”, thus strengthening a “narrative that supported the profession’s sense 
of historical mission”,67 for such effective conceptualisation to emerge, a natural 
moralising perspective of the Verdrossian kind that relied “on the self-evidence of 
natural law” to realize the unity of mankind, required a “critical and realistic monism” 
which would, complementarily, stress “the role of judicial practice in fixing its 
meaning”.68 Such was the approach proffered by yet another disciple of H.Kelsen, 
Hersch Lauterpacht. 
 
Lauterpacht’s contribution to the study of the science of international law has been 
approached as a hybrid of both traditionalism and a modernist sensibility that arose 
immediately following the First World War.69 In his scholarly work from the ‘30s and 
‘40s, his leaning towards a value-loaded substratum for international law differed from 
Kelsen’s formalist value-free anti-sociolegal notion “in regard to the place of natural law 
for legal construction”.70 This was Lauterpacht’s “political period” in which he openly 
defended peace as a legal postulate in international law, which he defined “as the law of 
the international community.”71 His support of the existence of a new doctrine of 
moderate natural law to replace voluntarism as the established dominant foundation of 
the science of international law,72 gained momentum in the so-called human rights’ 
period of his writing and made of him by making an important contributor to the 
universalistic human-rights focused natural law revival after the Second World War.73 
Sharing Kelsen’s modernist nominalism, Lauterpacht attempted, on the other hand, to 
bring the anti-sovereign ethos of this epochal reconstructive doctrine to the terrain of an 
empirical critical approach to positivism as practice. Along these lines, Lauterpacht 
identified the problem of reliance on “self-judgement”74 by sovereign states vis-à-vis 
international obligations as the basic obstacle for the realisation of a gradual 
transference of the rule of law to the international plane. Lauterpacht’s strong stance 
against a state-centered dogmatic voluntarism required from him to demonstrate that 
the former was at variance with both logic - through the stressing of the ad nauseam 
regress basis of the consensual principle - and facts, given that domestic maxims and 
general principles are key to filling the gaps between consensual norms.75 For 
Lauterpacht, “the establishment and the binding force of international law as a whole” 
are both “grounded in a factor superior to and independent of the will of states – a 
factor which gives validity to the law created by the will of the states. That superior rule 
is the objective fact of the existence of an interdependent community of states”. 76 This 
was, for Lauterpacht, in appropriate cases “also a source which (...) gives rise to legal 
rights and duties independently of the will of the states”.77  
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Lauterpacht attempted to transform the moralising rhetoric of a human-beings based 
international legal order, from a factor which safeguarded a state-centered international 
community (as in the Verdrossian approach), into a dynamic conception of the latter in 
the service of the gradual ascendancy of a cosmopolitan federal system. In doing so, he 
marked the gap between a platonically conceived lodestar at the service of the status-
quo, and the ambition of a progressive politics that, accordingly, sets out to combat the 
“scientific factuality”78 of voluntarist positivism itself. Indicative of this underlying 
objective during his “political period” is Lauterpacht’s proposal for the establishment of 
domestic enforcement mechanisms in the administration of international law. Such 
mechanisms would, in his view, convert the absolute sovereign freedom exercised by 
states in their conduct of foreign policy into a limited discretion in consonance with the 
completeness and unity of the law and its “priority over political will and political 
fact”.79  Indeed, the author’s non-conformist embrace of a federalist ideal during his 
final lustrum on the ICJ’s bench underlies his criticism of the self-judging reservations 
made by states to their declarations of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction80 as well as 
his defense of mechanisms for the protection of human rights at the international 
level.81  
 
Thus, when seen from the perspective of the contemporary renewal of international 
constitutionalism, it may be noted how Verdross and Lauterpacht still remain lasting 
underlying influences behind two different perspectives among contemporary 
international lawyers on how to treat ius cogens norms and erga omnes obligations in 
international law. While both thinkers supported the internationalization of the 
domestic social contract, which is the drive animating the telos of the discipline, 
Lauterpacht, with his insistence on the democratic control of foreign policy, was truer to 
the domestic dimension of the former while Verdross remained attached to a status-quo 
Western-grounded form of religious morality. But for these latter notions to help 
refashion, each in its own manner, the discursive archetypes of the inter-war year debate 
into a progressive substantive meaning of international law as “the law of the 
international community”,82 a series of normative outcomes still needed, as already 
noted, to be developed and conceptualised by that time and age. These normative 
developments would arise against the background of a post-Second World War 
doctrinal landscape characterised by “a turn to pragmatism in modern doctrines”.83 This 
flight from theory84 was reflected in an overall doctrinal loss of interest in the 
foundation of the binding character of international legal norms - a problem that, 
according to Roberto Ago at the time, “should be eliminated from the legal science”.85 
What remained of the latter scientific problematic was, as explained by Koskenniemi, a 
“modern programme of reconciliation” which “takes place by a double denial” in which 
“modern lawyers advocate a movement away from both naturalism and positivism”.86 
This turn to doctrine, characterised by a search for “an intermediate positioning”, which 
“is precisely what provides the modern’s argument identity”87 saw itself framed by an 
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American-led “canonical turn to pragmatism”.88 Inspired by a sociological89 and anti-
formalist orientation, which was nurtured in the U.S., among other countries, during the 
inter-war years90and, against whose influence the dominance of positivism had precisely 
promised the lawyer a method that would permit him to evade the realities of politics,91 
this epochal “displacement of theory by more practical concerns was regarded as a 
significant advance over the inter-war years as well as over the nineteenth century”.92 
Contributing to this “new practical spirit, an orientation to process and policy at once 
contextual, purposive and functional”93 is the influential retrospective realist 
interpretation of the “apparently fantastic constructions of a legalism or idealism that 
had been oblivious to the ‘realities’ of power in the international world”.94 Such a “post-
war sensibility realism”, which was a reflection of the new predominant position of the 
U.S. vis-à-vis the earlier European scientific tendency to isolate the sphere of 
international law “from ethics and mores as well as “from the social sphere, 
comprehending the psychological, policial and economics fields” and sociology”,95 set 
the ground for the constitution pace H.Morgenthau’s writing since the outbreak of the 
Second World War of international relations as an academic field.96 Morgenthau’s 
critique of Geneva’s negative metaphysicists97 who, “not unlike the sorcerers of 
primitive ages, attempt to exorcise social evils by the indefatigable repetition of magic 
formulae”,98 and his sketch of a functional theory of international law99 helped a policy-
oriented jurisprudence to become the predominant method in the U.S. academy from 
the ‘50s onwards. This passage was characterised, as explained by Kennedy, by an 
“emerging disciplinary pragmatic and realist consensus focused on either the 
international legal process or the neither-public-nor-private world of 
transnationalism”.100 Indeed, previous efforts to address the pedigree of 
constitutionalism in international law have stressed the role of the transformational anti-
formalism of the New Haven school101 which highlighted “the role of international law 
as an instrument of desired world order objectives and distributing resources in 
accordance with community policies”.102  
 
The theoretical architects of the policy-oriented jurisprudence developed a distinctive 
approach that stressed the continuum, anti-formal and policy-process relationship 
between law - which they defined as the interlocking of authority with power103- and 
politics. Their perspective was, moreover, informed by an underlying call for ethical 
responsibility in the upholding of a number of goal-values pursuant to a contextual-
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dependent “comprehensive global processes of authoritative decision”. The policy-
oriented jurisprudence’s commitment to the realization of a set of “goal values of 
international human dignity” is one that the New Haven school’s approach justifies by 
developing a systematic and open training method for scientific interpretation of policy 
factors to assure the adequate fulfilment of the decision-making function.104  Their 
analysis of international law as “not rules” but as a process-based “normative system 
harnessed to the achievement of common values”105is, in fully methodological 
contrasting terms to the earlier European formalist rule-approach constitutionalist 
perspective of German lineage.106 The New Haven school’s rules, which were informed 
by a sociological realist underlying call for ethical responsibility on the critical upholding 
of a number of values, has influenced, through the development of new theories of 
power, the contemporary call for the self-empowerment of experts.107 However, the 
complex methodological peculiarities of the policy-oriented jurisprudence approach 
explain sufficiently why it is usually set aside from the main general international 
constitutional tradition of analytical positivism. A further underlying reason for  this 
dissonance - leaving aside the fact that the New Haven school was historically labelled 
an apologist for U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War - is that, as presciently noted by 
Koskenniemi, even a world-order oriented  instrumentalism  of the kind that insists that 
“decisions be taken in accordance with the policy objectives of  a liberal, democratic 
world community”108 is  “often opposed by a constitutional formalism that seeks not so 
much the streamlining of the law with the requirements of power, but rather limits to 
power from increasingly widespread hierarchically arranged legal rules.”109 
 
More aligned with such a European formalist strand is the constitutional debate arising 
in the 1950s around the constitutional nature of the UN Charter. This debate led to the 
formation of at least two main interpretive approaches to the UN Charter: a textual or 
objective approach which defended the contractual nature of the foundational treaty,110 
and a constitutional approach. This constitutional approach was upheld on the grounds 
of a subjective method, prominently advocated by E. Jimenez de Arechaga and111 would 
find echoes in the ICJ’s case law.112 However, the practical implications of the debate for 
the interpretation of the UN Charter receded with the inclusion of the notion of ius 
cogens by Art. 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, and the establishment in its Art. 27 of 
the proviso that, even domestic constitutional law does not serve as a justification for 
non-compliance with international legal obligations.113 These developments would be 
followed, soon after, by the ground-breaking reference to erga omnes obligations in the 
Barcelona Traction case,114 as well as the parallel work of the I.L.C. and the notion of 
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international crimes – today a “stateless notion”.115 Key in the normative developments 
emphasizing a “hierarchy of rules, rather than sources, on the basis of their content and 
underlying values”116 was a parallel universalistic classical revival of natural law after the 
Second World War117 that accompanied the gradual (yet slow) emergence of the new 
field of international human rights law.118 This natural law revival would progressively 
ally itself with the re-emergence of the cosmopolitan faith triggered by the renewed 
move to international institutions in the war’s aftermath.  
 
Beginning in the late 1950s, the welfare and development activities119 of these 
institutions represented “the progressive overcoming of statehood by the economic and 
technical laws of a globalising modernity”.120 The dramatic expansion of the field of 
international law due to its horizontal extension with the decolonization process, greater 
institutional vertical development and consonant widening of its scope through new 
related fields that were accompanied by a series of normative and jurisprudential 
developments in the 1960s and 1970s, fuelled, at the time, the gradual renewal of the 
German international constitutionalist tradition. This revival, which took place under 
the influence of the author of Die Verfassung der Volkerrechtgemeinschaft121and his late joint 
work with Bruno Simma,122 was to find itself associated with the school of the “doctrine 
of international community” that had already been championed by W.Friedmann, coiner 
of the term of “co-operative international law” in his The Changing Structure of International 
Law123 in 1964. For Friedmann, such a structure included an international law of co-
existence or co-ordination, horizontally dependent on the sovereign state uti singuli, and 
a new dimension of international law, which had evolved “from an essentially negative 
code of rules of abstention to positive rules of co-operation”124and organization that he 
interpreted as pace setters of the progressive realisation of a more perfected 
international community. In highlighting “the shift in the subject matter of international 
law” towards an “international law of welfare”,125 Friedmann also championed a 
sociological inquiry into the interrelation between international law and international 
society and even produced a sketch of international constitutional law as a “new field of 
international law” consecrated to the study of international organizations.126 The notion 
of constitutional international law was further enshrined by H. Mosler, who became one 
of the first proponents of the concept of international legal community to defend the 
existence of a common public order “not restricted to mere formal principles” but 
inclusive of “substantive principles of co-existence and co-operation” which “are to be 
found in the general consciousness of human values which are the ultimate goal of any 
legal order”.127  
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With the end of the Cold War, mirroring the multifaceted impact on international legal 
scholarship of the revival of the international liberal political project, there has been a 
notable increase in the international community literature. The spirit of this post-
reconstructive doctrine has been summarily captured by B. Simma, who has noted that:  
 
“In contemporary international law the universalistic blueprint originally drawn up by natural 
law philosophy is slowly but steadily being turned into a reality. Thus, positive international 
law is moving in the direction of the ‘ought’ delineated by the school to which Verdross 
adhered. It is currently involved in a fundamental process of transformation from a mere ius 
inter potestates to a legal order for mankind as a whole”.128 
 
 Such a post-Cold War European reinforcement of this doctrinal “narrative of 
continuation with the past”129 is much informed by the natural teleology animating 
Kant’s 1784 The Idea for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose130 and with it the “ethos 
of the European Enlightenment that looked towards a universal federation of free 
republics”.131 Moreover, it might be seen as exemplary of how “post-Cold War lawyers 
have unearthed agendas that were at the centre of the legal developments in the early 
20th century”132 as shown by the assertive attitude of a number of international 
community-oriented authors regarding the constitutional character of both formal and 
substantive principles and fundamental rules of international law.133  
 
Among a number of German authors who, by expanding the concept of the 
international constitution coexistent with that of international community, have 
contributed to revamp the constitutional debate in the early 1990s, figures C. 
Tomuschat.134 Tomuschat’s perspective of international law as “the constitution of 
mankind”135 is usually seen as part of a contemporary constitutional trend whose 
authors are more assertive about the constitutional character of the substantive 
principles of the international community than were their predecessors. In contrast to a 
natural law approach of the Verdrossian kind, Tomuschat’s functionalist-grounded 
constitutionalist perspective is one that admits the radical indeterminacy of international 
law as one affecting the consideration of its “bindingness”.136 In doing so, Tomuschat 
appears to be implictly echoing the tension, deconstructed by post-modernist 
international legal theory, of the inescapable simultaneous search for concreteness and 
normativity present in the structure of the international legal argument137 that was 
thought to have triggered an eclectic pragmatic functionalism - helped in its 
development by the spurring of international institutions -  in the post-Second World 
War doctrinal scenario, as well as a correlate doctrinal flight from the very same focus 
on theory138 that the post-modernist turn139 in international law was to bring back to the 
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fore from the mid-1980s onwards. Tomuschat’s conception is usually seen as part of a 
German trend associated to a number of courses given by him at the Hague Academy,140 
as well as those imparted by Frowein141 or B.Simma or, more recently by Dupuy,142 who 
distinguishes between formal unity - characteristic of the classical period - and 
substantive unity as a characteristic of the contemporary period.143 Bardo Fassbender, a 
very vocal proponent of this line of thought has, indeed, highlighted how an internal 
tension in the work of the school “causes a certain doctrinal improvisation, and even an 
indecisiveness, that cannot satisfy those looking for a clear and convincing theoretical 
foundation upon which the concept of an international constitution could rest.”144 In his 
own work, Fassbender has attempted to enshrine a “sub-discipline of international law” 
under the label of the “constitutional law of the international community”.145 
Fassbender, who identifies the “UN Charter as the (substantive and formal) constitution 
of the international community,”146 has expressly located his efforts within what he 
defines as Tomuschat’s school147 and its emphasis on “the non consensual character as 
the principal feature of international constitutional rules”. 148  
 
This functionalist post-reconstructive doctrine benefits from the gradual transposition 
of “ius cogens” norms to fields other than the law of treaties including in the domestic 
legal sphere”149 as well as by the enshrinement of erga omnes” obligations understood as 
obligations towards the international community as a whole within a system of 
aggravated responsibility for serious violations of norms of particular importance to the 
international community.150 Moreover, in a global landscape of almost complete 
membership by all states in the UN, its appeal is enhanced by Article 103 of the UN 
Charter as “a rudimentary mandatory hierarchical structure of the international legal 
system which is not no longer at the disposition of national law and the nation state”.151  
The recognition of the existence of supra-positive norms has also gained preponderance 
through international and national judicial sanctioning since the 1990s, a phenomenon 
that has confirmed their gradual integration, which had previously been proposed 
mostly in international legal scholarship, into the traditional system of consent-based 
sources of international law, while also marking the limits of their scope within the 
latter.152  
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Building on the state-centered hierarchical backbone of formal constitutionalism, this 
trends attempts to add a number of substantively-informed non-consensual rules to the 
systemically required formal core of what has been traditionally termed the “necessary 
law of nations”, meta-rules, or secondary rules upheld by the rule of recognition. In 
doing so, the international community school claims that the progress of international 
legal practice has overcome the “radical inconsistency said or felt to exist in the 
conception of a state which is at once sovereign and subject to law.”153 Or, in other 
words, in defending the enshrinement of a general category of non-consensual norms, it 
sustains that a general exception has now been definitively added to a number of 
exceptions that long ago were, according to Hart, already “enough to justify the 
suspicion that the general theory that all international obligation is self-imposed has 
been inspired by too much abstract dogma and too little respect for the facts”.154 The 
gap between the consecration of such a general category and the gradual overcoming of 
another classic conceptual predicament faced by those defending the ontological 
character of international law – in other words, the lack of a system of organized 
sanctions in the international sphere – is bridged by these authors’ conviction that “the 
development of the concept of fundamental norms logically calls for centralized and 
institutionalised mechanisms to ensure their respect and enforcement”.155  
 
This is, in its shortest version, how the international community school (one that has 
been critically defined as a “weak reading of international constitutionalism”156 because 
it is “rooted in positivism and determined not to lose touch with actual state practice”157 
in its pretension to blend the "normatively desirable and the normatively feasible”)158 
harvests on a series of post-Cold War normative outcomes grown upon a soil of the 
post-Second World War era that was nurtured by the scholarly debates that took place 
during the inter-war years. 
 
3. The Post-Cold War Setting  
 
3.1. International Institutionalization  
 
The intensification of constitutionalist talk in international law has been so far examined 
in single terms as a “narrative of continuation with the past” in theoretical pursuance of 
the Kantian cosmopolitan lodestar. This narrative has thrived in a liberal culture aspiring 
to universalise the rule of law in the so-called post-realist age159 of the post-Cold war era, 
which is one that responds to the telos of a project that looks forward to crossing 
another conceptual threshold through the effort of international lawyers “to move away 
from diplomacy and politics”160and to enhance the rule of law beyond domestic settings. 
The contemporary appeal of constitutionalist talk concords with the great boost 
stemming from the increasing institutionalization of the international plane and from 
the parallel increase in the process “of legal and de facto denationalisation” brought 
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about by the ensuing “transfer of policies traditionally regulated by domestic law to 
international or supranational governance structures of regimes”.161 Legitimacy queries, 
which have arisen in connection to the problematic adaptation of the state-centered 
consent-based Westphalian model to an increasingly supra-nationalized post-Cold war 
setting, have become an inextricable part of today’s international constitutional debate. 
Moreover, the effects of globalisation on international law, including the forms of 
functional diversification known as fragmentation and deformalisation, have multiplied 
the challenges162 faced by an international constitutional perspective that travels in the 
same bandwagon with today’s ever-expanding international institutionalization. 
However, before examining how constitutional responses have developed in their 
attempt to come to terms with these latter phenomena, a word is warranted on the 
structural effects that the increase in international institutionalization has had on the 
development of the constitutional arena in recent times. 
 
The constitutionalist renewal in international law owes a great deal to the great 
development known by the phenomenon of regional integration in the last two decades 
and especially, within this framework, to the “spill over effect of the European 
debate”.163 As, if echoing Friedmann’s characterization in 1964 of regional groupings “as 
pace setters that will furnish models of integration that Mankind may later use on a 
universal level when it has reached a corresponding degree of community values and 
purposes”,164 the European debate is generally portrayed as one that has “illustrated the 
significance of constitutionalism as a frame of reference for a viable and legitimate 
regulatory framework for any political community, including those beyond a post-
national setting”.165 While the European constitutionalist scene is not one totally free 
from the legacy of the “statist” school in its analysis of the question “as to whether the 
EU has, or is capable of having a constitution”,166 the constitutional rhetoric, early on 
heralded by the European Court of Human Rights and the ECJ’s jurisprudence, appears 
today completely normalised167 and mainstreamed within this politico-legal realm.168 
However, two provisos usually accompany the appraisal of the international 
constitutional plane when it is approached from the perspective of the debate on 
European constitutionalisation. It is, in the first place, generally agreed that although 
one “less-developed and unsettled”,169 “the discourse on international constitutionalism 
is gaining momentum, but it is still in its infancy and appears rather slippery”.170 
Secondly, it is also usually noted that “the constitutionalization of the EC/EU is hardly 
suitable as a model for world-wide constitutionalism”171 or, to put it differently, that 
both should be seen as “two separate polities, each having their particular constitutional 
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ethos”.172 Nonetheless, cross-bred constitutionalist frameworks offer a great creative 
potential for analysing the nature and terms of the constitutional debates within both 
contexts173as they mirror the increasing hybridisation that characterises the exploration 
of diverse accounts of constitutionalism beyond the state.174 
 
Moreover, international organizations have also historically tended to attract 
constitutional methods of interpretation when elucidating the meaning of the inter-state 
compacts that form their constitutive charters. These methods are borrowed by analogy 
to domestic constitutional settings and cover the same range of doctrines of 
constitutional interpretation used in the domestic sphere. Insofar as the institutional law 
(or “laws” by other accounts) of international organizations,175 a variable number of 
organs are entitled to interpret an organisation’s constitutive documents. Interpretation 
by other plenary organs, tribunals or arbitral instances is generally done pursuant to the 
specific dispute settlement provisions in each foundational treaty. Despite its 
interconnectedness, the strictly derivational constitutional label attached to the “better 
described as an art and not as a science”176 interpretation of texts in international law 
should be distinguished from the rhetoric that has historically surrounded the use of 
constitutional analogies in connection to international organizations. This latter type of 
constitutional approach to the law of international organisations has been termed the 
field of “micro-constitutionalist analysis”.177 A number of classic debates bear witness to 
this traditional field of international constitutionalist interest. Among them, a reference 
should be made to those tackling hierarchy issues between organs within a specific 
international organisation; those referring to the delimitation of powers between 
international organisations and their member states; those touching upon questions of 
hierarchy between institutional universal frameworks and regional bodies; and those 
exemplified in the relationship between organs with a specific similar functional range.  
 
Even when made the object of a specific field of inquiry under the name of international 
constitutional law by W. Friedmann in the 1960s,178 this formal type of constitutionalist 
terminology in connection to international organizations has not been devoid of 
criticism. Thus, for J. Alvarez, “neither logic, function, text or history support 
constitutional analogies as applied to the UN Charter”;179 such an “inappropriateness of 
domestic constitutional analogies” is, according to this author, all the more true of other 
international organizations.180 For Alvarez, although the “presence and persistence of 
constitutional analogies remains a firm part of real world legal practice”,181 the resilience 
of constitutional analogies is only sustained by their pedigree as an argumentative 
strategic practice in academic quarters, among policy makers, and among international 
adjudicators.182 Constitutionalism, thus, appears, in this understanding, as barely more 
than the product of international lawyers’ professional bias inspired by the telos of the 
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discipline against an ever-present Realpolitik status quo. Alongside this perspective, the 
parallel contemporary trend towards the constitutionalization of treaty-regimes, 
although considered partly misdirected against overzealous organizations, and critically 
captured in its contemporary version in terms of “constitutionalism lite”,183 has been 
catalogued as “the subject of the first serious political debate on international 
organisations”,184 the merit of which lies partly in “that it takes organisations out of the 
occasionally somewhat stultified legal world of competences and ultra vires 
considerations” and opens the field of international organizations to considerations 
associated with the protection of fundamental rights and democratization.185 The field of 
“micro-constitutional analysis” and the field of “macro-constitutional analysis” appear, 
indeed, bridged by A. Peters’ appraisal of the WTO as pioneer of both types of 
approach.186 This author points to four factors fostering the constitutionalization of 
WTO law. These are the legalisation of dispute settlement, the principles of most-
favoured nation and national treatment, the fact that international trade rules overcome 
political process deficiencies, and the option of directly applying GATT rules.187 Her 
perspective should, however, be seen within the on-going multifaceted debate on the 
possibility, desirability, and practical implications of the constitutionalization of the 
WTO188 and, by extension, other international organizations.  
 
3.2. Fragmentation  
 
The burgeoning of constitutional talk within international law has, furthermore, been 
fostered by its association with anxieties189 related to the challenge posed by the impact 
of globalization on international law and the side-effects on international law of “one of 
the features of late international modernity”, which is “functional differentiation” 
understood as the “increasing specialization of parts of society and the related 
autonomization of those parts”.190 One form of such functional differentiation is 
embodied in the potentially conflicting diversification and expansion of international 
law brought about by the proliferation of international institutions dealing with 
specialised sectors such as, among others, trade, environment, human rights, security 
law, European law and international criminal law. This phenomenon has fostered an 
increase in self-contained regimes while reinforcing their sense of relative autonomy. If 
the proliferation of self-contained regimes has been identified as the “normative 
technical cause” of the debate on the fragmentation of international law, its 
“institutional cause” has been identified with the multiplication of international 
jurisdictions and the ensuing risk of contradictory international jurisprudence.191 
Defined as the doctrinal debate par excellence of the globalization age,192 there is an 
almost unanimous doctrinal agreement that the risk of fragmentation of international 
law brought by the “emergence of specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or rule-
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complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice”193 is one of the factors to 
which the international constitutionalist discourse owns its contemporary renewal.194  
 
The difficulties arising for international law from the splitting of law into functionally 
defined regimes “each geared to further particular types of interests, and managed by 
narrowly defined expert competence”,195 has recently been the object of a highly 
remarked ILC study-group report. After the sounding of the alarm by two consecutive 
annual reports by ICJ Presidents,196 the group was established to examine these 
difficulties; the selected chair was M. Koskenniemi.197 The manner in which the 
phenomenon of fragmentation has “started to reverse established legal hierarchies in 
favour of the relevant bias in the relevant functional expertise“198 is shown by the three 
forms of fragmentation – which are reflective of the phenomenon in both “its legislative 
and institutional form”.199  These are the practices of open (although rare) challenging of 
general international law by means of heterodox interpretations put forth by the new 
specialised institutions (e.g. Tadic case), the embodiment of solid exceptions by 
specialised regimes to general international law (e.g. human rights bodies’ competence 
stretching beyond state consent) and the opposition of particular regimes among 
themselves.200 The danger looming behind this phenomenon is that of “conflicts 
between rules or rule-systems, deviating institutional practices and, possibly, the loss of 
an overall perspective on the law”.201 In other words, “the rationale for the 
Commission’s treatment of fragmentation is that the emergence of new and special 
types of law, “self-contained regimes” and geographically or functionally limited treaty-
systems creates problems of coherence in international law.”202 Against this background, 
the report reaffirmed, as is widely known, that international law is a legal system and, as 
such, one respondent to systemic exigencies that account for the unity of international 
law.  The report’s conclusion has been translated in colloquial scholarly terms to mean 
that “you cannot just remove one of its fingers and pretend it is alive. For the finger to 
work, the whole body must come along”.203 The response given by the ILC to 
fragmentation via the “examination of techniques to deal with conflicts (or prima facie 
conflicts) in the substance of international law”204 “suggest that system and hierarchy are 
intrinsic to juristic thought, and thus also to international law”.205 This reaffirmation of 
formal unity allows for the linking of the constitutionalist field with what one may 
loosely be defined as the hierarchy of international norms’ dimension of constitution-
related general discourse. As such, it has been interpreted as an advance from earlier 
debates on the existence of normative hierarchies in international law vis-à-vis disputes 
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about the systemic existence of the latter.206 The report’s decision to grant the ICJ’s plea 
for unity, represented by the finding that there are no legal regimes outside general 
international law, brings to bear formal normative constitutionalization as a response to 
fragmentation’s differentiation. The reporting’s findings, however, should not obscure 
the fact that they constitute something of a phyrric victory when seen against 
Koskenniemi’s background analysis.  
 
According to Koskenniemi, the emergence of multiple specialised regimes implies that 
the political conflict about the “question of significance” - which is not intrinsic, but 
dependent on the interests and preferences from which one examines the question to 
know which is “the regime most relevant, or specific, to a matter”207- transforms itself 
into a conflict of jurisdictions, a struggle for institutional hegemony. This is due to the 
emergence of multiple anti-formal expert regimes, each of which seeks “to make its 
special rationality govern the whole, to transform its preference into the general 
preference”.208 The fact that “fragmentation becomes struggle for institutional 
hegemony”209is, according to Koskenniemi, underwritten by an integrative systemic 
vision of international law which says that “no more than that whatever decision, it 
should be made by legal institutions, in particular institutional settings populated by 
public international lawyers”.210 While the Commission decided to leave the question of 
institutional competencies (the competence of various institutions applying international 
legal rules and their hierarchical relations inter se) “as one best dealt with by the 
institutions themselves” and to focus, instead, on the substantive question,211 in practice 
“the agreement that some norms simply must be superior to other norms is not reflected 
in any consensus in regard to who should have a final say on this”.212 In Koskenniemi’s 
analysis, the superiority of some norms over others does not imply a consensus on a 
hierarchy between the various legal regimes, nor a consensus on the hierarchy of 
institutions representing general international law vis-à-vis other forms of 
institutionalised structural bias. The reaffirmation of the unity of the international legal 
system as an attempt to control fragmentation in both “its legislative and institutional 
form,”213 is, thus, not considered effective against a “natural development”214 that 
“reflects the rapid expansion of international legal activity into various new fields and 
the diversification of its objects and techniques”.215  
 
In order to grasp the full dimensions of the effect of the Commision’s decision to grant 
the ICJ’s plea for unity -  which is formal in its suggestion that “no special regime is to 
be understood as independent of international law”-216on the spread of international 
constitutional vernacular in international law, it is necessary to examine how the 
reaffirmation of the unity of the international legal system finds itself playing a rhetorical 
keystone role vis-à-vis empire, and the influx on the equation of deformalisation as a 
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form of functional differentiation pursuant to the effects of globalisation on 
international law. But, before dealing with a normatively value-oriented 
constitutionalism, which is one interpreted to be supported, yet not without debate,217 
by normative formal hierarchies, it might be worthwhile to refer to what appears as the 
doctrinal opposite variety of unity in connection to the phenomenon of fragmentation 
of international law. This, which presents itself, as a variant of the hydra-like renewal of 
constitutionalist vernacular in contemporary international law, is the parallel 
evolutionary development of transnationalism and regime theory, otherwise systems-
theoretical perspectives in this area - a line of thought pertaining to the 
“fragmented/societal model of constitutionalism” à la Teubner and Fischer-Lescano 
pace the sociology of N.Luhmann with their extension of constitutionalism beyond 
purely intergovernmental relations to “a multiplicity of civil constitutions”.218 Against 
what it perceives as the “wholly unrealistic attempt to create a hierarchy within the 
fragmentation of global law”,219 a chimera which, following the de-centering of politics, 
is seen “as by far the most advanced statement” of legal pluralism,220 this approach sees 
in the constitutionalization of autonomous sub-systems of world society the only 
“damage limitation” available. Faced with inter-regime conflicts between the currently 
proliferating sectoral regimes, the best law can offer, for these authors, is, therefore, to 
accept its epiphenomenality in acting as “a gentle civiliser of social systems”221 for the 
sake of “intra-regime responsiveness to the immediate human and natural 
environment”.222 An example of the application of this approach would likewise go 
maintain that in the era of globalisation, due to the transition from government to 
governance conceived “as the horizon of all possibilities for self-determination” in a 
heterarchical world, self-determination’s of regimes is assuming the rank of a 
foundational constitutional principle of global governance. 
 
 Their questioning of whether one can actually talk of one international community and 
one international value system and their understanding of transnational regimes as 
bound to replace territorial states confronts the stress of this approach on auto-poietic 
regulatory systems with the state-centered international constitutionalism of “the 
hierarchical/political model” à la Tomuschat, Fassbender or Dupuy. The latter is 
identified with an international community school that pre-empts the latter and pretends 
to maximise in a vocabulary of constitutionalism the post-Cold war harvest of the 
doctrinal seeds planted and cultivated since the end of World War II on the soil 
nurtured by the inter-war years’ debate. Two other converging factors lie behind the 
hydra-like renewal of constitutionalist parlance in international legal doctrine: the 
strengthening of the vernacular vis-à-vis the emergence of Empire as well as the sword 
of Damocles posed in opposition to its very substantive pretensions by the 
phenomenon of deformalisation in international law. These factors will now be 
examined.   
 
3.3. Constitutionalism as Reaction to Deformalisation and Empire  
 
Together with fragmentation, a second form of functional diversification fostered by the 
spur given to the pre-eminence of the rule of law on the international law plane in the 
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image of liberal Western domestic politics, is the deformalisation of international law. 
Deformalisation has been understood as “the process whereby the law retreats solely to 
the provisions of procedures or broadly formulated directives to experts and decision-
makers for the purpose of administering international problems by means of 
functionally effective solutions and balancing interests”.223 As already seen in the context 
of fragmentation, “the proliferation of new regimes - even when they are based on 
formal international law rule-making (…) - lead into contextual ad-hocism that further 
strengthens the position of functional experts.”224 If the emergence of anti-formalist 
expert regimes goes hand-in-hand with the phenomenon of the emergence of multiple 
specialised regimes and corresponding worries about fragmentation, the roots of the 
phenomenon of deformalisation might be retraced more profoundly to the post-Cold 
War’s zeitgeist insofar as, as explained by Koskenniemi, the latter “emerge(s) from the 
sense that traditional diplomats’ law is failing to manage the problems of a globalising 
world due to its excessive formality and rigidity and its failure to adapt to new regulatory 
needs. A shift is thus required from formal rules and institutions to the objectives or 
values “behind” them”.225 Concomitant to what was defined, a decade ago, as the “turn 
to ethics” in international law, deformalisation is, thus, a consequence of the “the 
takeover of the managerial mindset (which) is reflected in the transformation of the 
vocabularies of power. The language of law is replaced by an idiolect of transnational 
regimes that enforce the most varied kinds of guidelines, directives, de facto standards, 
and expectations, so as to guarantee optimal effects”.226 Moreover, such a gradual 
acceptance of a managerialist vocabulary227 of compliance, legitimacy, cost-benefit 
analysis et al., reflects a growing spill-over of the discipline of international relations228 
into the domain proper to international law pursuant to a pedigree of anti-formalism 
which has been retraced back to the post-Second World War era. In this understanding, 
deformalisation reveals itself both allied with Empire, understood as “as the emergence 
of patterns of constraint deliberately intended to advance the objectives of a single 
dominant actor, either through the law or irrespective of it”,229 as well as with any 
instrumental-value hegemonic pursuit by relative dominant actors thus, explaining why, 
in Koskenniemi’s view, constitutionalism “may equally consolidate types of authority 
that seek to perpetuate Europe’s comparative advantage”.230 
 
Against this background, the granted plea for unity against the worries brought about by 
fragmentation has understandably allied itself with a rhetoric mostly heralded by 
international lawyers from Europe in favour of constitutionalisation. This can be seen as 
a politico-emotional reaction to what is perceived as the lawless imperialism of U.S. 
neoconservatives and the defence of the UN’s role in international legal governance at a 
time defined by J.Habermas as “one witnessing the advocacy of the liberal ethos of a 
superpower as an alternative to law”.231 Constitutional talk is intrinsically connected with 
the foregrounding of the UN Charter as the constitution of the international community 
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supplemented by other constitutional by-laws specifically dealing with the international 
legal regime for the protection of human rights. However, the usefulness of the formal 
version of constitutionalism - otherwise one that “suggests that system and hierarchy are 
intrinsic to juristic thought” while “a battle European jurisprudence seems to have 
won”232– has been seriously doubted against the background of the “institutional 
hegemonic struggle” from which fragmentation derives. Even more serious doubts are 
raised when one tackles, from the perspective of the phenomenon of deformalisation, 
the fact that the reaffirmation of the unity of the international legal system finds itself 
playing a key role in conceptions of a post-national constitutional value-ridden order 
that attempts to flesh out its architecture with a normatively purposive bias. As noted on 
grounds of the paradox of objectives by Koskenniemi “the undoubted increase of law 
into the international world (legalisation) does not translate automatically into a 
substantive constitution in the absence of that sense of shared project or objective. If 
deformalisation has set the house of international law on fire, to grasp at values is to 
throw gas on the flames”.233 The evolution towards new vocabularies of international 
law grounded on international relations is, according to this view, prone to channel new 
forms of lego-material domination which, as such, find fertile ground in the solipsist 
character of sectoral regimes in international law. Being each of these regimes ridden by 
its own hegemonic substantive telos as channeled through de-formalized instrumental 
vocabularies, jurisdictional conflict and a struggle for institutional hegemony is likely to 
arise. These struggles and conflicts will occur in a transnational sphere which is gradually 
becoming more impermeable to contestation by a lego-formal rationality of sovereign-
states which, paradoxically enough “stands as an obscure representative of an ideal 
against disillusionment with global power and expert rule”234 today. 
 
3.4 Legitimacy  
 
The developement of a democratic focus in international law allows can be framed as an 
area of evolution within the international constitutionalist field. The already extensive 
scope of the present inquiry does not allow for a comprensive discussion of the ways in 
which the peculiarities of the multifaceted democratic debate in international law may be 
transferred to the constitutional arena. Yet, the juxtaposition of some background on 
this debate with an examination of the role played by democracy in international 
constitutionalism provides a guidepost for distinguishing a number of schools of 
international constitutionalist thought. Thus, the sovereignist pretensions of the 
neoconservative theory of international law, so extensively examined in the post-9/11 
legal literature,235 can be said to represent the “core of the skeptic’s challenge”236 to the 
constitutionalist understandings of international law. When seen from the perspective of 
the democratic debate in international law, the neoconservative challenge can be as a 
school of thought closely related to the intra-state dimension of the emergence237 of the 
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democratic principle in international law. In its most basic version, such position is 
founded on grounds of the sacrosanct democratic character of the U.S’ Constitution in 
the pursuit of unbound national interests against any pretensions of legitimacy of an 
international law composed by non-democratic states and non-legitimised state actors. 
In this light, neoconservative theory can be seen as a mere political nationalistic 
radicalisation of what has been, in softer or stronger liberal forms, the general 
orientation of liberal internationalist schools of international law in the U.S. and part of 
Western Europe since the early 1990s. Critics’ efforts have been decisive in tracing a 
highly qualified doctrinal map of these diverse schools by academically labeling them 
under the banner of “liberal anti-pluralism”238 or “liberal millenarism”.239 A number of 
trends ranging from the “Kantian theory of international law”,240 to the “democratic 
entitlement school”,241 and including “the liberal internationalist dual agenda”,242 post-
cold war realist variants of the “New Haven School”,243 “Rawlsian Liberalism”244 or 
“liberal cosmopolitism”245 have in common their persuasive support – which is, 
incidentally, one not devoid of a sound international legal basis in practice -246 of the 
emergence of a right of intrastate democratic governance in international law. However, 
as is widely known, the democratic principle of international law does not exhaust its 
potential by distinguishing between states in terms of the domestic form of government 
or, if preferred, the democratic principle in international law is not limited to its intra-
state dimension of its emergence. It would suffice in order to illustrate this point to 
refer, in passing, to a number of schools of thought that are more affected by the supra-
state dimension of the emergence of the democratic principle in international law. These 
include a series of perspectives ranging, among others, from the administrative global 
law project247 to the cosmopolitan democratic project of creating global democratic 
international institutions,248 to those other perspectives now captured under the label of 
“compensatory constitutionalism”.249 Finally, a third dimension of the emergence of the 
democratic principle of international law is the classic inter-state dimension of the 
principle. The legal goal of the inter-state democracy project can be equated with the 
aspiration to make a reality the rule “one state, one vote” and thereby with that of 
procedurally according the same weight to every state’s vote within the international 
law-making process. Inspired by  the principle of  individual electoral equality within 
domestic popular sovereignty-based democratic systems, this doctrine, which purports  
to  transpose democracy as a constitutive principle  to  inter-state  relations  is, 
occasionally,  presented  as  the  synthesis  of  the  principles  of  equal  sovereignty  of  
states,  self-determination of peoples, and distributive justice.250 As such, it is  retraceable 
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to the  horizontal  extension  of  the  international  community  of  states  brought  
about  by  the decolonization process in the sixties that was given governmental backing 
in political terms  in  the  1970  Lusaka  Declaration  issued  by  the  third  conference  
of  the  non-aligned  movement which  flagged the democratization of  international 
relations understood as “an  imperative necessity of our times” due to the “tendency on 
the part of some of the big powers  to  monopolize  decision-making  on  world  issues  
which  are  of  vital  concern  of  all  countries”.251 This  anthropomorphic-inspired  goal  
to  democratize  international  relations  through  state  majoritarian  formulae, that is 
closely  associated  with  the  New  Economic  International Order252 and, as such, a 
component of a broader “have not” agenda,253 can be framed as a procedural strategy 
adopted by the Third World States in their attempts to use sovereignty, understood, in 
the academic discourse of the time, as “the hard long prize of  their own struggle for 
emancipation” or “the legal epitome of the fact that they are masters  in  their own 
house”,254  to develop a new  international  law. Briefly exposed, these three general 
dimensions of the emergence of the democratic principle in international law could well 
be employed as benchmarks in examining the fundamental role played by the 
legitimacy/democratic equation in any discussion of international constitutionalism in 
contemporary international law. 
 
4. Conclusion  
  
Alongside the image of constitutionalism as a narrative of continuation with the past 
whose profile has been boosted in recent literature among other converging and parallel 
factors, as a reaction to “fragmentation, deformalisation and empire”, it may be, to 
conclude, worthwhile recalling Koskenniemi’s insight on “how the force and the 
apparent novelty of today’s fragmentation has obscured the degree to which it captures 
a classical international law problem”. Indeed, according to Koskenniemi, the question 
“how is law between sovereign states possible?” is not too different from the question 
“how is law between multiple regimes possible?”255 because of “how especially 
European international lawyers have sought to combat through the vocabulary of 
constitutionalism” the fact that public international law has been “sliced up into regional 
or functional regimes that cater for special audiences with special interests and special 
ethos”256 that are “broken down into boxes, each of them (…) solipsistic and 
imperialistic”.257 While Koskenniemi’s dual examination of both fragmentation and the 
phenomenon of deformalization casts doubt on the adequacy of a value-ridden 
constitutionalization of international law, the fact remains that the classic inter-war year 
debate on “how is law between sovereign States possible” appears today reversed in the 
contemporary global governance setting affected by the phenomena of functional 
diversification. In this new scenario, international constitutionalism appears re-staged as 
a state-centered counter-reaction to the problem brought about by the proliferation of 
specialised regimes in international law acting solipsistically and empire-like. It is, in fact, 
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the same state solipsism against which Kelsen reacted in his attempt to come to grips 
with the “sovereign question” and to enshrine in international law a normativist 
grounded self-constitutive bias in favour of a community- based order. The reversion is 
complete when one analyses how, on the other hand, legal pluralism, traditionally 
characterised by its state-centered approach, re-appears in today’s debate as an anti-state 
regime-centered legal pluralism. It is against the background of the reversal of the terms 
of this fundamentally conforming debate, that one might better appreciate the different 
uses to which the notions of legitimacy and democracy have been put by different 
schools and trends of thought in the contemporary cross-bred space offered by the 
constitutionalist field and, thus, to appreciate how, in contrast to Kelsen’s time, 
democracy is today the wind rose of international law.   
 
 
 
 
